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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," copyright law
has, since its constitutional creation, existed in a reciprocal tension between the
expansion and limitation of an author's exclusive rights.' This reciprocity serves
as the mechanism used to try to effectuate the appropriate balance between
incentives for authors to create and the right of the public to freely use those
creations. However, like a foreign species introduced into a stable ecosystem,
technology serves as the foil to this balance and ensures that U.S. copyright law
must be updated and adapted in order to fulfill its constitutional purpose.
On October 28, 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was
signed into law, ushering in the most "sweeping revisions ever to the Copyright
Act of 1976. ''2 The impetus underlying its enactment was "to bring U.S.
copyright law 'squarely into the digital age.' As part of the ceaseless struggle to
keep up with constantly evolving technology, this law proposes to 'make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.' "' The
most important provision of the DMCA attempts to mandate respect for digital
rights management (DRM) 4 byinstituting anticircumvention provisions5 into U.S.

' "[The Congress shall have the power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
2 David Nimmer,A RPffon FairUse in the DigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673,
674 (2000).
3 Id.at 680-81 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998)).
4
[DRM systems restrict the use of digital files in order to protect the interests of
copyright holders. DRM technologies can control file access (number of views,
length of views), altering, sharing, copying, printing, and saving. These
technologies may be contained within the operating system, program software,
or in the actual hardware of a device.
Chris Hoofnagle, Panel on Consumer Privay E-Commerce Marketplace, 701 PLI/Pat 1339, 1367-68
(2002). Some common examples of DRM systems include password requirements, encryption, CSS,
and region coding. For more information on DRM see Electronic Privacy Information Center,
DigitalRghtsManagement andPrivagy,availableathttp://www.epic.org/privacy/drn/default.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2005).
' These anticircumvention provisions, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 1201, (2000) generally prohibit
two types of action: "(1) The conduct of 'circumvention' of technological protection measures that
control access [to a work protected by U.S. copyright law] and (2) trafficking in any technology,
product, service, device, or component that protects either access to a copyright work or that
protects the 'rights of the copyright owner.' " Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg.
63,578, 63,578 (Oct. 15, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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copyright law-in effect, a ban on the act of circumventing or trafficking in
devices that circumvent certain DRM systems.6
Congress recognized that although the DMCA provides the ability for authors
to protect their works from infringing use, it was "appropriate to modify the flat
prohibition against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
control access to copyrighted materials, in order to ensure that access for lawful
purposes is not unjustifiably diminished."' As such, Congress included in the
DMCA an exemption from the ban on circumventing technologies that control
access to works.8
Codified in section 1201 (a)(1)(B)-(E), this exemption was enacted "[i]n order
to ensure that the public will have continued ability to engage in noninfringing
uses of copyrighted works, such as fair use." 9 This exemption, considered a "failsafe" mechanism for offsetting the adverse effects of section 1201, is implemented through a triennial rulemaking proceeding conducted by the Register of
Copyrights. The Register exempts users of particular classes of works if such
persons are (or in the next three years are likely to be) "adversely affected by the
prohibition.., in their ability to make noninfringing uses.., of [that] class of
copyrighted works."1 On October 27, 2003, after accepting comments from the

6 See Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 63,578 (Oct. 15, 2002). "Tide I of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [which contains the anticircumvention provision] was, inter alia,
the congressional fulfillment of obligations of the United States under the WIPO Copyright Treaty
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty." See also 17 U.S.C. 5 1201; see generaly
Nimmer, supra note 2. See 17 U.S.C. 5 1201 (2000) For additional information on the historical
background and the legislative history of Tide I, see an earlier version of an Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies,
64 Fed. Reg. 66,139,66,140 (1999), availablatwww.loc.gov/copyright/fedreg/1 999/64fr66139.html.
7 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
8 17 U.S.C. 5 1201 (a)(1) "applies when a person who is not authorized by the copyright owner
to gain access to a work does so by circumventing a technological measure .... " Copyright Office
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 63,579. The exemption was intended to "monitor developments in
the marketplace for copyrighted materials, and allow the enforceability of the prohibition against the
act of circumvention to be selectively waived, for limited time periods, if necessary to prevent a
diminution in the availability to individual users of a particular category of copyrighted materials."
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36.
' 68 Fed. Reg. 62011 (Oct. 31, 2003).
1017 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). "Given the threat of a diminution of otherwise lawful access to
works and information.., a 'fail-safe' mechanism is required." H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36.
As part of the rulemaking proceeding, identification of the particular class of works to be exempted
is made by the Register of Copyright "who is to provide notice of the rulemaking, seek comments
from the public, consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the
Department of Commerce, and recommend final regulations to the Librarian of Congress."

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2005

5

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1

J. INTELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 12:309

public and holding several hearings on the matter, the Registrar of Copyrights
issued her Recommendations for the triennial section 1201 exemptions."
The "fail-safe" triennial exemption provision of the DMCA has drawn both
high praise and scathing criticism. 2 This Article examines whether the provision
is effective for its intended purpose: to serve as a countermeasure to the DMCA's
anticircumvention procedure by protecting the ability of the public to engage in
noninfringing uses of copyrighted works, such as fair use.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that there are too many faults in both the
structure and the execution of the rulemaking provision to meaningfully
counteract the adverse effects of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA.
Specifically, the rulemaking procedure explicitly refuses to consider granting an
exemption to a class based on the use of the work-a rejection of principles that
compose fair use which one of the very doctrines the exemption provision was
supposed to protect.
Part II of this Article provides a general overview of copyright law, fair use,
and the details of the DMCA. Part III details fully the DMCA's triennial
exemption provision, providing the history for, and impetus behind, its inception,
a review of the rulemaking process, and the past and present exemptions granted
by the Librarian of Congress. Finally, Part IV considers whether the exemption
provision is effective in preserving "Congress' commitment to fair use"' 3 and the
public's ability to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works. It will consider
the inherent problems with the procedure, the issues reflected by the public's
comments and replies, and the treatment of the provision by the Librarian of
Congress. Ultimately, this Article concludes that although the provision
purportedly serves as a counterweight to the anticircumvention laws, in reality it
is barely more than a placebo mechanism that does very little to effectuate fair use
in our digital society.
II. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, FAIR USE, AND THE
ENACTMENT OF THE DMCA
A. FAIR USE

The U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors

" See Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to James H. Billington, Librarian of
Congress (Oct. 27, 2003), available athttp://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommend
ation.pdf. These exceptions are discussed in detail infra Part III.c.
12 Nimmer, supra note 2.
" Letter From Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 4.
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and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""
The granting of these "limited monopolies" serves as incentive for authors to
create, and the expiration of these monopolies serves to benefit the public by
allowing them free use of the work upon expiration. "To this end, copyright [law]
assures authors the right in their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work."'"
One of the most essential concepts in this balancing act is fair use. "When
appropriate, fair use is an affirmative defense to an infringement claim, relieving
the party from obtaining permission from the copyright holder and the obligation
to pay a royalty or damages." 16 In other words, copyright law recognizes that
certain uses of copyrighted works that ordinarily would constitute infringement
are justified under public policy, justice, and fairness, or are simply too innocuous
to warrant a valid defense to any claim of infringement.
Ultimately codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the concept of fair use
has played a critical role in ensuring that the incentives given to the author to
create do not overpower the public's interest in making use of those works. Lord
illustrates the public policy that came to be
Mansfield's analysis of this tension
17
reflected in the U.S. Constitution:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just
merits, and the reward for their ingenuity and labour; the other, that
the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded.18
"Following the dictates of the Intellectual Property Clause, copyrights are
limited in time. Moreover, in order for the social progress identified in the
Constitution to take place, the public must have access to the work created. One

14 U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 8.

is Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275,
1279 (1991); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419 n.10 220
U.S.P.Q. 665 (1984) ("The enactment of copyright legislation... is not based upon any natural right
that the author has in his writings,.. . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted. ... ' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 602222, at 7 (1909)).
16Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the DigitalMillenniumCopyjghtAct EnablesDigital
Content Owners to CircumventEducationalFairUse, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 6-7 (2002).
' Id.at 5.
1 Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (K.B. 1785).
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cannot build upon the unknown."' 9 From as early as the nineteenth century,
courts were mindful of the need for the public to use an author's copyrighted
work without his permission. In 1841, in the case of Folsom v.Marsh,2° Supreme
Court Justice Story "formulated a set of principles that would serve as the
foundation for what we now call fair use."'2
Justice Story determined: "In short, we must often ...look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects of the original work. ''22 These guidelines proved to be the
cornerstone for the development of the fair use doctrine in the United States.
Over the following two centuries, fair use was developed and codified, thereby
providing greater guidance in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work should be protected. Section 107, the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act, states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.23

19Sharp, supra note 16, at 6.
20 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)(No. 4,901).
2

Sharp, supra note 16, at 6.

SFolrom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss2/1
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It is important to note that section 107 represents only guidelines for what
should be considered fair use; it is by no means an exhaustive list. Additionally,
the legislative history of section 107 explicitly states that "the doctrine must
continue to live beyond technological changes. In other words, fair use is
technology neutral. The limits imposed by fair use make the method of copyright
irrelevant. Conversely, copying beyond the limits of24 fair use constitutes
infringement without regard to the technology involved.5
Although fair use has, and will continue to be, a somewhat amorphous
concept, it has proven to be invaluable in maintaining the balance and furthering
the policy of copyright law. Fair use has proven especially important in the
modern digital age, which has enabled the public to make more substantial and
efficient use of copyrighted works. Although no court has yet to indisputably find
that fair use is a constitutional requirement, it is impossible to see how the goals
of copyright law could be furthered without the fair use doctrine.2"
Consider the critical and paramount importance of fair use in the wake of
digital rights management systems and the DMCA. The proper scope and
application of a doctrine that validates unauthorized use within a scheme that
prohibits unauthorized use is perhaps one of the most controversial topics in
modern copyright law.2 6 It is appropriate to briefly explore the background of the
DMCA in order to understand the conflict that has ignited such passion.

24 Sharp, supra note 16, at 8-9 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976)). Moreover, "there

is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66. For more information on fair use, see ROBERTA. GORMAN
&JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 614-748 (Foundation Press 2002).
2 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317-19, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1873,1886-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affdsub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d 1953 (2d Cir. 2001); Robert P. Taylor & Ethan B. Andelman, Antidircumvention Underthe
DMCA: Where Do We StandAfter 5 Years?, 764 PLI/Pat 101, 115 n.73 (2003). Taylor and Andelman
remark:
Although the Corky court did not necessarily agree that fair use was constitutionally required, the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003) suggests that it is. See Eldred, 123 S.Ct. at
788-89 (describing fair use as a "built-in First Amendment accommodation[ 1"

and a "traditional First Amendment safeguard[ ].")
Whether fair use is a constitutional requirement is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
information, see Stephen M. McJohn, Tradition, The CopyrightClause, andthe Consituiona/iZationofFair
Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 95 (2003).
26 See general Nimmer, supra note 2.
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B. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

1. Development of the DMCA. The importance of digital technology can be
summed up in four words: quality, quantity, selectivity, and expediency. Before
digital technology, the word "copies" held a somewhat different connotation.
With the exception of very few devices, copies were often inferior to the original,
especially if they were second or third generation copies. Digital technology,
however, allows a user to make a near-perfect copy of the original that is, for all
practical purposes, indistinguishable from the original.
Traditional books, compact discs, VHS tapes, and other non-digital mediums
also took up space. Now, a user can store numerous libraries of information on
a digital medium the size of her hand. Furthermore, before digital technology,
searching for a desired work could be a laborious process, involving a search of
libraries, archives, retail stores, and other scattered sources. Now, a user can
access nearly any work she desires from the comfort of her home, filtering the
information in nearly any way she desires.27
Finally, a user can accomplish all of these tasks in seconds. What took a copy
machine fifteen minutes now takes a computer a millisecond. Thanks to the
interconnectivity of the Internet, users can now exchange these works. However,
perhaps the most substantial change the digital revolution has brought about is
that, in many instances, a user can do all of this for free.
Enter Congress. "Historically, Congress has achieved the objective of the
Constitution's Copyright Clause 'by regulating the use of information-not the
devices or means by which the information is delivered or used by information
consumers-and by ensuring an appropriate balance between the interests of
copyright owners and information users.' ,28 Indeed, the Copyright Act is largely
"technology neutral," in the sense that, by and large, it does not "regulate
commerce in information technology, i.e., products and devices for transmitting,
storing and using information. Instead, [it] prohibit[s] certain actions and create[s]

27 One scholar has noted:

The promise of digital technology rests in its capacity to bring enormous
quantities and varieties of data, images, sounds and texts to users empowered to
filter the information for the content they desire. News information from
throughout the world is now delivered to personal computer screens in real-time.
Recorded entertainment is placed on media that has more than twice the storage
capacity of its predecessor, produces superior playback quality, and has a longer
archival life.
Sharp, supra note 16, at 2.
" Nimmer, supra note 2, at 683 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998)).
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exceptions: to permit certain conduct deemed to be in the greater public
interest ...."29
However, Congress saw that the advent of digital technology necessitated a
new approach to copyright legislation. In the debate over what would eventually
become the DMCA, the Commerce Committee stated:
[T]he digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of
copyright owners, and as such, necessitates protection against
devices that undermine copyright interests. In contrast to the
analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to reproduce
and distribute perfect copies of works at virtually no cost
at all to
30
the pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws.
As such, Congress incorporated anti-circumvention structures into the WIPO
Treaties Act, which would compel the DMCA.31 "Those structures target not
only bad acts (the activity of copying itself), but also bad machines (devices that
facilitate copying) and bad services (conduct
that enables copying). In this
' 32
manner, copyright law expands its reach.
2. TbeAnidrcumvenlion Provisions. Codified in section 1201, the DMCA creates
three distinct types of anticircumvention violations with civil and criminal
penalties: a basic provision banning circumvention of measures that control
access to a work, and two different bans on trafficking devices or systems
designed for circumvention.33 The first trafficking ban makes it illegal to traffic
in technology primarily designed to circumvent devices that control access to
copyrighted works, and the second makes it illegal to traffic in technology
primarily designed to circumvent devices that control the copying of copyrighted

works.34
Of primary concern to this Article is the basic ban on circumvention of
technology that controls access to a work.3" According to the statute, this ban
dictates that one cannot "avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a
technological measure" that "requires the application of information, or a process
'
or a treatment .
to gain access to the work."36
As two scholars noted, "[in

29

Id.

30H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25.
31See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 684.
32 id

3317 U.S.C. 5 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1) (2000).
3417 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).
35Section 1201(a)(1)(A) states that "[nlo person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this tide."
36

Id.
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cannot decode or decrypt a copyrighted work in
practice, this means that one
37
order to gain access to it."
The basic ban on "access" circumvention is the only provision of the three
anticircumvention provisions that is subject to the triennial exemptions
promulgated by the Librarian of Congress. 3 However, much of the debate
the two trafficking bans should also be
surrounding this issue centers on whether
39
provision.
exemption
the
in
included
The bans on trafficking attempt to prohibit users from manufacturing,
importing, offering to the public, or otherwise trafficking in any technology or
service that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
a technological measure that controls either (1) access to a copyrighted work' or
(2) the rights of a copyright owner (i.e., the ability to copy a copyrighted work).4

Taylor & Andelman, supra note 25, at 106.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2000). See infra Part III.
3 Nimmer, supra note 2, at 737. "The reach of the trafficking ban is unjustifiably broad;
Congress should have reconciled the trafficking ban with the exemptions that it placed on the basic
provision."
0 Section 1201(a)(2) states:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this tide;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this tide; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this tide.
4i Section 1201(b) states:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right
of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this tide in a work or a portion
thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this tide in a work or a portion thereof.
38
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It should be noted that while the basic ban on access circumvention has a
corollary trafficking ban, the only ban that exists relating to technologies that
protect an author's rights (by controlling the ability to copy works) is the
trafficking prohibition. This means that it is not a violation of the DMCA to
directly circumvent a technological measure that prevents the copying of a
copyrighted work (a technology that protects the rights afforded to a copyright
owner). This exclusion was a deliberate attempt by Congress to preserve fair
use.

42

Professor David Nimmer offers a helpful explanation on the true effect of the
statute:
As to prohibited access, the person engaging in that conduct has
violated the basic provision; anyone assisting her through publicly
offering services, products, devices, etc., to achieve the prohibited
technological breach is separately culpable under the ban on
trafficking. By contrast, a person who engages in prohibited usage
of a work to which he has lawful access does not fall afoul of any
provision of section 1201. It is only someone who assists him
through publicly offering services, products, devices, etc., to achieve
the prohibited technological breach who becomes culpable under
the additional violations.43

42 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection

Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558 (Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pr. 201). Moreover, in United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120-21, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d 1736 (N.D. Cal. 2002), Judge Whyte stated:
("The decision not to prohibit the conduct of circumventing copy controls was
made, in part, because it would penalize some noninfringing conduct such as fair
use.'). In fact, Congress expressly disclaimed any intent to impair any person's
rights of fair use: "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, or
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title..." 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (c)(1). Thus, circumventing use restrictions is not unlawful, but in
order to protect the rights of copyright owners while maintaining fair use,
Congress banned trafficking in devices that are primarily designed for the
purpose of circumventing any technological measure that "effectively protects
a right of a copyright owner," or that have limited commercially significant
purposes other than circumventing use restrictions, or that are marketed for use
in circumventing the use restrictions.
Id. at 1120-21.
43Nimmer, supra note 2, at 689-90.
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Along with these new provisions enabling copyright owners to protect their work
came the potential for abuse-an issue not lost on Congress during the drafting
of the DMCA.
3. The Roe of Fair Use in the Aniircumvention Provisions, or Lack,7Thereof.
According to the HouseJudiciary committee, the ban on circumvention of access
technologies "was intended to impose absolute liability against those who lack
authorized access. It was only when the subject access was authorized that 'the
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, would be fully
applicable."'" In other words, "fair use would apply only following lawful access,
not as a basis for obtaining such access in the first instance. '
Indeed, it is important to note that the DMCA explicitly leaves fair use
untouched, and technology neutral.' Instead of allowing a fair use defense against
a charge of an anticircumvention violation, "vindication of user interest comes
directly in section 1201 itself and in other aspects of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. In other words, there is no such thing as a section 107 fair use
defense to a charge of a section 1201 violation; rather, section 1201 itself includes
provisions designed to aid the interests of users[,]" such as an exemption for
certain classes of works.47

III. THE DMCA's TRIENNIAL "FAIL-SAFE" EXEMPTION PROVISION
Congress was aware that the anticircumvention provisions created the
potential for "less access, rather than more, to copyrighted materials that are
important to education, scholarship, and other socially vital endeavors."48' Myriad
situations could potentially decrease the public's access to works, such as the
disappearance of hard copies, encryption devices and other DRM systems that
remain infinitely active; new business models that focus on restricted distribution
and availability; or other unknown factors.49 As such, Congress found that it was
"appropriate to modify the flat prohibition against the circumvention of effective

Id.at 716.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 "[A]n individual would not be able to
circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to do so in order to
make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully').
' Section 1201 (c)(1) states that "[niothingin this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations
or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this tide." Congress "determined
that no change to section 107 was required because section 107, as written, is technologically neutral,
and therefore, the fair use doctrine is fully applicable in the digital world as in the analog world."
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 23-24 (1998).
4"Nimmer, supra note 2, at 723 (emphasis added). For more information about the interplay
between fair use and the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, see id. at Part III.A.4.
48 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
'9See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 693 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt.2, at 36).
'4
45
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technological measures that control access to copyrighted materials, in5 0order to
ensure that access for lawful purposes is not unjustifiably diminished.
A. PURPOSE OF THE PROCESS

Spurred by the potential for harm arising from the anticircumvention
provisions, Congress created an exemption to the basic ban on circumvention of
access technology which, according to Congress, serves to monitor the marketplace for copyrighted materials and grant an exemption to the ban on access
circumvention for a limited time if it is necessary to prevent a decrease in the
availability to users of a particular category of copyrighted materials.5
Generally,
[t]he purpose of [the exemption] rulemaking proceeding is to
determine whether there are particular classes of works as to which
users are, or are likely to be, adversely affected in their ability to
make noninfringing uses due to the prohibition on circumvention.
may exempt such classes
If there are, the Librarian [of Congress]
52
prohibition.
statutory
the
from
More specifically, the provision codified in section 1201 (a)(1)(B)-(E), was enacted
to "ensure that the public will have continued ability to engage in noninfringing
uses of copyrighted works, such as fair use"5 3 by providing that the prohibition
against circumvention
shall not apply to persons who are users of a copyrighted work
which is in a particular class of works, if such persons are, or are
likely to be in the succeeding three-year period, adversely affected
by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing
uses of that particular class of works under [the Copyright Act] .5
In other words, the Librarian of Congress will promulgate new exemptions
every three years to users of a particular class of works which, in his judgment, the

so Id. at 693-94 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36).

Id at 694. "Implementation here depends on rulemaking undertaken pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act."
52 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 (Feb. 10, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
" 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(B) (2000).
54 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 22.
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access anticircumvention provision harm, in terms of their ability to use
copyrighted works.
B. THE MECHANICS OF THE EXEMPTION PROVISION

It should be reiterated that the focus of the rulemaking process is limited to
section 1201 (a) (1), which bans circumvention of technologies that control access
to copyrighted works. "The Librarian [of Congress] has no authority to limit
either of 55the anti-trafficking provisions contained in subsections 1201(a)(2) or
1201 (b).")

The exemption provisions begin in subsection 1201 (a) (1) (B), which states that
the access anticircumvention provision will not apply to persons who are users
of a "particular class of works. 5 6 The term "particular class of works" is
intentionally left undefined. The term is to be identified in a rulemaking
proceeding conducted by the Register of Copyrights, who is to provide notice of
the rulemaking, seek comments from the public, consult with the Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce,
and recommend final regulations to the Librarian of Congress. 7 This provision
is the source of great debate and will be covered in depth later in this article.
An important characteristic of the exemption provision is that neither an
exception from liability, nor the whole rulemaking procedure can be used as a
defense for any purpose other than relief from liability under section
1201(a)(1)(A). 5 Professor Nimmer explains this concept, stating:

" Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
System for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63578, 63579 (Oct. 15,2002) (codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201) ("In this triennial rulemaking proceeding, effects on noninfringing uses that are
unrelated to section 1201(a) (1)(A) may not be considered.'.
(B) reads:
This entire portion of section 1201 (a) (1)
The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to persons who
are users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if such
persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected
by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that
particular class of works under this title, as determined under subparagraph (C).
51 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention on Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62011, 62012 (Oct. 31,2003) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
s817 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(E). "Neither the exception under subparagraph (B) from the
applicability of the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A), nor any determination made in a
rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C), may be used as a defense in any action to enforce
any provision of this title other than this paragraph."
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a defendant whose usage wins exemption in pertinent rulemaking
does not thereby gain any mileage in urging a fair use defense to
copyright infringement, as opposed to a defense to the instant
charge of violating the basic provision of section 1201. Likewise,
a defendant who convinces the court that he falls within the
exemption, even though not listed in the Librarian's published rules,
should not be heard to make headway in any other feature of U.S.
copyright law. 9
As such, the defense seems to be one of a "paracopyright" nature, i.e., a defense
that, notwithstanding the effects it has on substantive copyright law, intentionally
separates itself from traditional copyright doctrines such as fair use and the first
sale doctrine.6"
1. Evaluafion Periods. Upon the enactment of the DMCA, the statute provided
for a two-year delay before the first exemptions were to be promulgated by the
Librarian of Congress. The main purpose for this delay was "to allow the
development of a sufficient record as to how the implementation of [DRM
technologies]
is affecting availability of works in the marketplace for lawful
'6 1
uses.
At the end of the two-year period between 1998 (the year of enactment of the
DMCA) and 2000 (the expiration of the two-year delay), the Librarian of
Congress made an initial determination as to classes of works to be exempted
from the prohibition for the first triennial period. 62 This determination was made
upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights following an extensive
rulemaking proceeding.63
The exemptions promulgated by the Librarian in the first rulemaking remained
in effect until October 28, 2003.64 At that point, the exemptions created in the
first anticircumvention rulemaking expired, and the exemptions recommended by
the Librarian of Congress for the second rulemaking session took effect for a new
three-year period. The exemptions from the second rulemaking session will
expire on October 27, 2006, and the rulemaking process will continue with a new
set of exemptions from the third rulemaking session, and so on.65

s Nimmer, supra note 2, at 698-99.
0 Id. at 686 n.66, 699 n.132. This provision is consistent with Congress's overall intention to

leave traditional copyright doctrines, such as fair use, unchanged with the passage of the DMCA.
61 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 37.
62 For more information, see infra Part III.C. 1.
63 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access

Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011.
64 Id.
65 Id

For more information, see infra Part III.C.
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It is during this three-year window that the Library of Congress and the
Registrar of Copyright embark on the rulemaking procedure by attempting to
gauge the adverse effects of section 1201(a)(1)(A) by soliciting comments and
replies to those comments, holding hearings, and conferring with the Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce.
2. Responsibilities of the Register of Copyrights and the Librarianof Congress. The
primary responsibility of the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress
is to determine "whether users of particular classes of copyrighted works are, or
in the next three years are likely to be, adversely affected by the prohibition in
In other
their ability to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works ....
words, the Register and the Librarian must "to assess whether the implementation
of access control measures is diminishing the ability of individuals to use
copyrighted works in ways that are otherwise lawful."66 Section 1201(a) (1)(C) sets
out the areas that are to be examined as part of their inquiry:
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability
for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research; (iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures
on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (v) such other
factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.67
It is apparent that the Register must give special consideration to her attempts to
balance the availability of works for use, the effect of the prohibition on particular
uses and the effect of circumvention on copyrighted works.68
3. The Necessary Showing. Although the burdens of proof for proponents and
opponents of an exemption are not included in the text of the statute:
[a] fter reviewing the record and the legislative history of the section,
the Register concluded that the burden of proof for [the] proposed
exemption was on the proponents of the exemption. In order to
make a prima facie case for an exemption, proponents must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been or is likely

66 Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 6.
67 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
68 Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 6.
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to be a substantial adverse
effect on noninfringing uses by users of
69
copyrighted works.

A de minimis problem, "isolated harm, or mere inconvenience would not
suffice to provide the necessary showing."" ° The addition of the word "substan-.,
tial" before the word "adverse effect" in the language of this burden is a.source
of great contention for some and an issue that will be addressed later in this
Article."
.
For proof of likely, or future adverse affects on noninfringing uses, "the
Register found that a proponent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the harm alleged is more likely than not; a proponent may not rely on
speculation alone to sustain a prima facie case of likely adverse effects on
noninfringing uses."72 A proponent of an exemption must also show a causal link
"between the prohibition on circumvention and the alleged harm." 3
Finally, all proposed exemptions are reviewed de novo. "The existence of a
previous exemption creates no presumption for consideration of a new
exemption, but rather the proponent of such an exemption must make a prima
facie case in each three-year period." 4
4. Determinalionof Class of Works. One of the most contentious aspects of the
rulemaking procedure is the scope of the term "class of works" as it relates to
what may be exempted. The Register of Copyrights determined during the first
rulemaking proceeding that "the statutory language requires that the Librarian
identify a 'class of works' based upon attributes of the works themselves, and not
by reference to some external criteria such as the intended use or users of the
works.""
More specifically, the Register found that the statute must be
interpreted as "requiring a 'class' to be defined primarily, if not exclusively, by
' 6
reference to attributes of the works themselves."

69 Id.at 10.
70

Id.

71 Id.; see infra Part IV.C.2.
72 Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 11.
73
74

Id.
Id.

75 Id.
76

Id. The Commerce Committee addressed this issue during the DMCA's proposal period,

stating
[t]he issue of defining the scope or boundaries of a "particular class" of
copyrighted works as to which the implementation of technological protection

measures has been shown to have had an adverse impact is an important one to
be determined during the rulemaking proceedings. In assessing whether users
of copyrighted works have been, or are likely to be adversely affected, the
Secretary shall assess users' ability to make lawful uses of works "within each
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Emphasizing that it is not permissible to classify a work by reference to the
type of user or use (e.g., libraries or scholarly research), the Register reasoned that
the term "category" is well understood within the realm of copyright law to mean
a section 102 category or copyrightable subject matter." Using section 102
categories as a starting point, the Register found that "the description of a
'particular class of works' ordinarily should be further refined by reference to
other factors that assist in ensuring that the scope of the class addresses the scope
of harm to noninfringing uses."78
However, the more refined the class becomes, the less useful the exemption
is to users. This refusal to consider the use or user of a work in determining the
scope of the class is perhaps the largest flaw in the exemption provision and
contrary to established notions of fair use.79
C. THE PAST AND PRESENT EXEMPTIONS GRANTED BY THE LIBRARIAN OF
CONGRESS

1. The First Exemptions (2000-2003). On October 27, 2000, the Register of
Copyrights concluded that a case had been made for an exemption for two classes
of works: 1) "Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering

particular class of copyrighted works specified in the rulemaking." The
Committee intends that the "particular class of copyrighted works" be a narrow
and focused subset of the broad categories of works of authorship than [sic] is
identified in section 102 of the Copyright Act (12 U.S.C. 102).
H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2 at 38 (1998).
" Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 12. Section 102 of the
Copyright Act states:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this tide, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
literary works; (2) musical works,
authorship include the following categories: (1)
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and(8) architectural works.
12 U.S.C. § 102(a).
7' Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 26. The Register
expounded on this finding, stating, for example, the class might be defined in part by reference to
the medium on which the works are distributed, or even to the access control measures applied to
them. But classifying a work solely by reference to the medium on which the work appears, or the
access control measures applied to the work, would be beyond the scope of what a particular class
of work is intended to be. And it is not permissible to classify a work by reference to the type of
user or use (e.g., libraries or scholarly research).
7' This argument is addressed fully in Part IV.A.
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software applications; and 2) Literary works, including computer programs and
databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access
because of malfunction, damage or obsoleteness."8 °
These two exemptions were granted because they were two of the limited
number of proposals that could properly be categorized under the term "class of
works": Most proposals were unable to satisfy this burden due to the term's
inflexibility and extremely limited scope.81 Additionally, the two were some of 'the
few proposals to demonstrate actual harm to their ability to engage in
noninfringing work. 2
Indeed, the legislative history reveals that Congress "anticipated that
'
The Librarian rejected
exemptions would be made only in exceptional cases."83
any proposed exemptions that classified a work by reference to the type of user
or use of the work.84 This, not surprisingly, eliminated a substantial number of
the proposals.85
2. The Second and PresentExemptions (2000-2003). On October 28, 2003, the
Register of Copyrights concluded that a case had been made for four exemptions,
which, generally, are: 1)Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by
commercial filtering software that blocks access to websites, 2) Computer
programs protected by obsolete hardware locks that prevent access due to
malfunction or damage, 3) Computer programs and video games in obsolete
formats that require the original format for access and, 4) Works distributed in
ebook format when all ebook editions of the work prevent enabling of the readaloud function. 6

" Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,562 (Oct. 27, 2000) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
s Id. at 64,563; see infra, Part IV.B.
82 See generaly Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556.
" Id. at 64,563.
14 See id.
85 See general'y id.
' Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62013-14 (Oct. 31, 2003) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). The full text of the exemptions reads:
(1) Compilations consisting of lists of Internet locations blocked by commercially
marketed filtering software applications that are intended to prevent access to
domains, websites or portions of websites, but not including ists of Internet
locations blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to protect
against damage to a computer or computer network or lists of Internet locations
blocked by software applications that operate exclusively to prevent receipt of email.... (2) Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due
to malfunction or damage and which are obsolete. (3) Computer programs and
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.Like the previous rulemaking session, the sparse exemptions were the few that
met the definition of the term "class of works" and could demonstrate actual or
likely adverse effects caused by access controls.8" Many of the proposals were
rejected because they requested either blanket proposals, use-based, or user-based
proposals, of which are all impermissible under the current regulatory scheme.88
The Register explicitly rejected proposals for exemptions for fair use works and
per se educational fair use works on their use-based status. 9
The Register also rejected several submissions thatwere not use-based because
they failed to define their proposal in a way that would qualify as "a particular
class of works." 9° Proposals for "any work to which the user had lawful initial

video games distributed in formats that have become obsolete and which require
the original media or hardware as a condition of access. [A format shall be
considered obsolete if the machine or system necessary to render perceptible a
work stoted in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably
available in the commercial marketplace.] (4) Literary works distributed in ebook
format when all existing ebook editions of the work (including digital text
editions made available by authorized entities) contain access controls that
prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that prevent the
enabling of screen readers to render the text into a "specialized format." ...
The official website provides definitions that correspond to the exemption:
Definitions. (1) "Internet locations" are defined to include domains, uniform
resource locators (URLs), numeric IP addresses or any combination thereof. (2)
"Obsolete" shall mean "no longer manufactured or reasonably available in the
(3) "Specialized format," "digital text" and
commercial marketplace."
"authorized entities" shall have the same meaning as in 17 U.S.C. § 121.
Exemption to Prohibition on circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011. A full analysis of the reasoning and effect of these provisions
is beyond the scope of the paper, which focuses on the rulemaking process as a whole. For a
detailed explanation of the rationale behind granting the exemption, see Letter from Marybeth Peters
to James H. Billington, supra note 11.
8' Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011.
' Id. at 62,014-15. Many submissions proposed an exemption for "all works," e.g., fair use,
private use, or other use-based proposals. Due to its "use-based" status, the Register also rejected
a submission the proposed to exempt:
(1) Musical recordings and audiovisual works protected by access control
mechanisms whose circumvention is reasonably necessary to carry out a
legitimate research project where the granted exemption applies only to acts of
circumvention whose primary purpose is to further a legitimate research project;
and (2) Musical recordings and audiovisual works protected by access control
mechanisms whose circumvention is reasonably necessary to carry out a
legitimate research project.
89 Id. at 62,014.
90Id. at 62,015.
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access" :and "thin copyright works" failed to provide
the specificity and narrow
91
tailoring necessary to qualify for the exemption.
A substantial number of submissions were rejected for failure to prove.
evidence of actual or likely harm. 92 Those submissions whose evidence of harm
was judged to be de minimis or a mere inconvenience were also rejected. 9
Additionally, some proposals were rejected because the proposal for exemption
did not sufficiently demonstrate that acting pursuant to the exemption would be
noninfringing use.94
Submissions proposing an exemption for all public domain works were
rejected because the Register wisely noted that the prohibition on circumvention
only applies to works protected by copyright to the exclusion of works in the
public domain.9" Finally, the Register rejected all proposals that were beyond the
scope of the rulemaking provision, such as webcasting, limitations of liability for
online service providers, and the antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA. 96
Although these exemptions purport to remedy the apparent adverse effects of
the anticircumvention provision for certain classes of users, the effectiveness of
these exemptions is suspect and considered in the following section. Nonetheless, these rules will serve to exempt any users of these four particular classes of
works from section 1201 (a) (1) (A)'s ban on circumvention until October 27,2006.

9 Id. "Thin copyright works" are works that contain a limited amount of copyright material.

See Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 98.
92 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. at 62,015-17. Examples include "Any work
to which the user had lawful initial access (and variations)," "Musical works, sound recordings, and
audiovisual works embodied in media that are or may become inaccessible by possessors of lawfullymade copies due to malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness," "Audiovisual works embodied in DVDs
encrypted by CSS" and "published sound recordings of musical works on compact discs that use
technological measures that prevent access on certain playback devices." Id
93 Id. at 62,015. For example: "Audiovisual works released on DVD that contain access control
measures that interfere with the ability to defeat technology that prevents users from skipping
promotional materials."
9' Id. at 62,017. One submission proposed to exempt "broadcast news monitoring," to which
the Register replied "[t]he 'limited purpose' for which the broadcast monitors seek an exemption
does not appear to constitute a noninfringing use." Id.
" Id. The effectiveness of this aspect is highly debatable, and is discussed infra, Part IV.
96 Id.
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ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRIENNIAL

EXEMPTION PROVISION
Fail-Safe: Capable of compensating automaicallyand safelyfor afailure,as
of a mechanism orpowersource; .... Guaranteednot to fail.97
Determination of whether the exemption provision is truly a fail-safe
mechanism for safeguarding fair use turns on the analysis of several key factors,
including the scope of the provision, the ambiguities in the statute, burden of
proof, and the treatment of the provision by the Register of Copyrights and the
Librarian of Congress. The most consequential factor under this analysis,
however, is the scope of the term "class ofworks," and, thus, what is available for
exemption consideration.
A. THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE TERM THE
TERM "CLASS OF WORKS" TO BE CONSIDERED FOR EXEMPTION FRUSTRATES THE
PURPOSE OF THE EXEMPTION PROVISION

By not allowing the term "class of works" to be defined by either the use or
user of that work, the exemption provision runs afoul of its purpose both
theoretically and pragmatically. Instead of harmonizing fair use and the
anticircumvention provisions, it creates a distinct separation between the two,
essentially placing them at odds with each other.
This assertion begins with the premise that the exemption was enacted to
protect the ability of the public to engage in fair use.95 By its very nature, the use
that a person makes of a copyrighted work is the focal point by which the entire
determination of fair use hinges. Based upon that premise, in order to truly
preserve the public's ability to make fair use of copyrighted works, any exemption
granted in furtherance of fair use should focus on use first, not the intrinsic value
of the work, which is simply one of the four factors to be considered in a fair use
evaluation.
An exemption that is not based on the use of a work does not protect the
public's ability to make fair use of a work. Instead, it is simply an exemption
crafted to appeal to our notions of equity when a particular technology imposes
a more onerous burden on its users than the appropriate authority is prepared to

9

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 655 (3d ed. 2001).

98 To reiterate, the Register of Copyright affirms this purpose. "In order to ensure that the

public will have continued ability to engage in noninfringing uses of copyrighted works, such as fair
use, subparagraph (B) [the exemption provision] limits this prohibition [on circumvention]." Letter
from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 4.
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allow. Although this result is laudable, it is not in furtherance of the goal that
spurred the creation of the exemption provision: protection of the public's ability
to engage in fair use.
In addition, the legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates that fair use
is technology neutral; the doctrine must continue to function regardless of
changes in technology that serve as the medium for copyrighted works.99 As
such, instead of keeping fair use liberated from the constraints of technology, the
current interpretation of the term "class of works" actually chains any potential
fair use to the particular attributes of the works themselves, which are inextricably
interwoven with the technology or medium that embodies the work.
As noted above, the Register limited the scope of the "class of works"
language to a subset of one of the categories listed in section 102 of the Copyright
Act. This determination was based on the Commerce Committee's use of the
word "category" in discussing the proper scope of the definition of the term
"class of works."'" The Register also noted that the Committee often used the
terms "class of works" and "categories of works" interchangeably.' This line of
reasoning is ultimately thin, and a strained reading of the text.
The comments submitted by the Association of American Universities assert
that
there is simply no reasonable support for the [Librarian of Congress's] 2000 Final Rule's conclusion that "classes ofworks" cannot
be further defined based upon attributes of users or environment
the
of use. The type of user or use are core factors in determining
02
right of fair use, which is at the core of this rulemaking.'
The comments note that "the rulemaking provision in the statute itself expressly
refers to the particular 'user' and 'noninfringing uses' of the works."' 3
Indeed, although several proposals for exemptions were rejected by the
Librarian of Congress because they proposed a class larger than one of the

9 Sharp, supra note 16, at 9 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). "T]here is no
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change.").
100Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 12.
101Id
102 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,578 (Oct. 15, 2002); Comments of the
Association of American Universities (Dec. 18, 2002) at 8, avai/lbk at http://www.copyright.gov/
1201 /2003/comments/028.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,2005) [hereinafter Comments of the Association
of American Universities.
' Id.; see discussion in Part III.B.4 and accompanying notes.
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categories set forth in section 102 (because use-based exemptions can. apply to all
categories), at least one of the previous exemptions contemplated "the inclusion
of multiple categories of works, unified by a characteristic related to usability of
the work.... In other words, certain 'classes of works' clearly can and will cut
across section 102 'categories.' 104 The logic that classes can cut across various
102 categories instead of being a subset of 102 categories further supports the
'contention that classes of work can be based on the use of a work, which, unless
modified, would cover all of the categories in section 102.
Using another rationale, the Librarian of Congress refused to consider usebased classes of works using the rationale that if Congress had intended for
classes to be based on the use or user of the works, it could have included such
a provision in the statute.' °5 A more sound interpretation, however, was that
Congress's use of the word "class" instead of "category," along with the various
references to the words "uses" and "users" in the statue, reflects Congress's
in scope to
intention that the term "classes of works" should be 0flexible
6
accommodate whatever exemption the situation compels.'
"If Congress had intended each 'class of works' simply to be a subcategory of
a section 102 (or 103) category, and defined only based upon certain attributes of
the work, it certainly 'could have said so.' ,107 However, such a limited scope is
not consistent with the extensive legislative history referring to the intent to
preserve fair use, especially in light of the statutory framework's reliance on the
terms "users" and "noninfringing uses."' 8
This interpretation is furthered by the fact that the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce, with whom
the Register is compelled to confer regarding the appropriate exemptions, stated
that the intended use of the work or the attributes of the user will, in certain

104 Comments of the Association of American Universities, supra note 102, at 8. The comment

refers to the exempt class of "literary works protected by malfunctioning access controls.
The Copyright Office's reasoning in recommending this class indicates that, were
users to show that damage or malfunctions were preventing access to protected
CDs or DVDs, for example, the category appropriately would be expanded to,
e.g., 'literary works, musical works, sound recordings, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works . . . protected by access control mechanisms that fail
[due to malfunction, etc.]'

Id.

JosLetter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 84-85. "Had Congress
wished to exempt all circumvention when it is for the purpose of 'noninfringing use,' or 'fair use,'
it could easily have done so. Giving the Librarian authority to exempt 'a particular class of
copyrighted works' is not designed to accomplish that end, or even to accommodate such an end."
10 Comments of the Association of American Universities, supra note 93, at 8.
107 Id.
108

Id.
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situations, be critical to the determine the meaning of a "particular class of
works."1 9 Although the Register of Congress addresses and considers in her
recommendation to the Librarian of Congress many of the observations put forth
by the Assistant Secretary, this particular assertion, while acknowledged, is
essentially discarded without reply by the Register.
In defense of the Register of Copyrights, it should be noted that she has
repeatedly requested in her recommendations that Congress provide her with
additional guidance on the term "class of works.""0 The request is entirely valid,
as previous treatment of the exemption demonstrates that the flexible nature of
the scope of the term "class of works" can essentially render the exemption
provision meaningless and irrelevant for the purposes of protecting fair use.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION PROVISION CRIPPLES ITS ABILITY TO HAVE
ANY MEANINGFUL EFFECT

The most detrimental aspect regarding the scope of the exemption provision
is that it only allows for exemptions to the ban on directly circumventing an
access control device."' If a person traffics in any device or system primarily
designed to circumvent an access or copy control mechanism, he or she will be
guilty under the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA regardless of whether
the exemptions relieve the person performing the direct circumvention from
liability.
This limiting construction has numerous flaws. By addressing only the ban on
circumvention of access control devices, Congress failed to provide any relief for
the adverse effects caused by the antitrafficking provisions. As such, the
exemption provision provides incomplete relief and ultimately fails to balance the
adverse effects of section 1201.
Many, if not most, of the adverse effects caused by section 1201 are outside
the scope of the prohibition on circumventing access controls. Instead, the
effects are caused by the antitrafficking provisions of section 1201, and
specifically the ban on trafficking in devices that circumvent copy control
measures. For example, the submitted comments reflect adverse effects in a
user's ability to make noninfringing uses ofworks because of copy control devices
in musical works, movies, and games." 2 Some of the adverse affects of DRM

109 Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 15.
110 Id. at 20.

1201(a)(1) (2000).
12Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 103.

117 U.S.C.
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systems are outside the scope of 1201 altogether, such as contractual overreaching
in licensing agreements and a block on the ability to fast-forward a DVD."3
The most critical and damaging aspect of the exemption provision's limited
scope is that, in most situations, an advanced understanding of software code and
digital rights management is required in order to circumvent the complex and
often secret algorithms, encrypted computer code, and various technological
schemes employed by copyright owners." 4
For those users who cannot write software code, decrypt algorithms, or
otherwise break the technologies on which companies have spent countless
dollars to ensure that they will not be broken, the exemption provisions are
entirely worthless, since any devices that could help them would be effectively
banned by the antitrafficking provisions." 5 Because most computer users are
probably not sophisticated enough to circumvent such complex technological
devices, the exemptions that are promulgated are, on the whole, worthless.
For example, recall that one of the exemptions to arise from the most recent
rulemaking session exempts circumvention of an ebook's access controls that
prevent a view from enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function." 6 Although the

113Id. at 109, 150.

An example of a DRM device that is representative of the complex nature of access and copy
control devices is the Content Scrambling System, or "CSS." In a recent Second Circuit case, the
court explains that:
[t]he studios ...sought an encryption scheme to protect movies on DVDs.
They enlisted the help of members of the consumer electronics and computer
industries, who in mid-1996 developed the Content Scramble System ('CSS').
CSS is an encryption scheme that employs an algorithm configured by a set of
'keys' to encrypt a DVD's contents. The algorithm is a type of mathematical
formula for transforning the contents of the movie file into gibberish; the 'keys'
are in actuality strings of O's and l's that serve as values for the mathematical
formula. Decryption in the case of CSS requires a set of 'player keys' contained
in the compliant DVD players, as well as an understanding of the CSS encryption
algorithm. Without the player keys and the algorithm, a DVD player cannot
access the contents of a DVD.
Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-37, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953, 1956 (2d Cir.

2001).

115 Professor Nimmer concurs with this logic, stating that the "fair use safeguards," so highly
touted as
securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to
achieve their stated goals. If the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only
users whose interests are truly safeguarded are those few who personally posses
sufficient expertise to counteract whatever technological measures are placed in

their path.
Nimmer, supra note 2, at 739.
16 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31,2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
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exemption applies to any user, it was ostensibly enacted in order for the visually
impaired to take advantage of ebooks, which they can only do if the read aloud
function of the ebook is enabled." 7
However, in order to take advantage of this exemption, the visually impaired
user will have to figure out a way to circumvent the access control device
prohibiting enablement of the read-aloud function. This device, presumably,
would be sufficiently complex in order to justify its inclusion and fulfill its
prohibitive purpose. The ban on trafficking in circumvention devices essentially
forces the visually impaired user to rely on his or her own expertise, or the
assistance of friends within a physical proximity, in order to receive the blessing
of the exemption.
It is unlikely that a substantial number of visually impaired computer users will
have the technological sophistication to circumvent a technological access control
device. Accordingly, with the exception of a few highly sophisticated visually
impaired users, the ebook exemption is worthless because its proposed class is
enable to take advantage of it.
This situation exposes the glaringly insufficient scope of the exemption
provision. It also demonstrates that, notwithstanding the Register's refusal to
consider the type of user for a particular class of work, Congress implicitly built
in a certain type of user into every exemption: Users that are technologically
sophisticated enough to directly circumvent access copy controls.
The exemption provision's shortcomings become more apparent when
considering the small number and limited duration of the exemptions. The most
recent rulemaking session resulted in only four exemptions of extremely limited
scope that will expire in three years unless renewed. Therefore, the small number
of users that can take advantage of this exemption are confronted with the
possibility of losing the privilege in three years. The Register even concedes that
some of the exemptions 8were granted notwithstanding the fact that very few
people would use them."

pt. 201).
117

Id.

The final exempted class is based upon proposals by the American Foundation
for the Blind ....
It is in response to problems experienced by the blind and
visually impaired in gaining meaningful access to literary works distributed as
ebooks... The record indicates that many ebooks are distributed with the [readaloud] function[ ] disabled.
11 The Register stated that "[a]lthough there was little need for an exemption in quantitative
terms (i.e., in terms of the number of persons likely to take advantage of it directly), it was the
qualitative need for an exemption that was controlling in this case." Letter from Marybeth Peters
to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 26.
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Upon examination, the limited scope of the exemption provision renders the
exemptions practically worthless because the intended users are likely unable to
take advantage of the waiver of liability. Additionally, the time limitation and
small applicability of the exemptions will prevent the provision from serving as
a meaningful protection for fair use.
C. IS THE NECESSARY SHOWING REQUIRED TO OBTAIN AN EXEMPTION TOO
BURDENSOME AND FLAWED TO VINDICATE THE INTERESTS OF FAIR USE?

As previously stated, the burden for proving that an exemption is warranted
is on the proponent of the exemption." 9 The Register explicitly holds that "[T]n
order to make a prima facie case for an exemption, proponents must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been or is likely to be a substantial
adverse effect on noninfringing uses by users of copyrighted works."' 2 °
Depending on interpretation and clarification, this burden of proof could be so
difficult to satisfy that it effectively prohibits passing any meaningful exemptions
that would ensure the protection of fair use.
1. Does the CopyrightOffice Place Too Much Importance in ProofofActualHarm Over
a Likelihood of Harm Showing? The Copyright Office has held, based on previous
legislative history, that "the determination [of an exemption] should be based
upon anticipated, rather than actual adverse impacts only in extraordinagy
of
circumstances.' 12 ' Furthermore, the Copyright Office requires that a showing
122
likelihood of harm include "distinct, verifiable, and measurable impacts.'

"' Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011.
120 ld.
121 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumventions of Copyright Protection

Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,559 (Oct. 27,2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
pt. 201) (emphasis added). The full-text of the Librarian's statement reads:
Although future adverse impacts may also be considered, the [House] Manager's
Report states that "the determination should be based upon anticipated, rather
than actual, adverse impacts only in extraordinary circumstances in which the
evidence of likelihood of future adverse impact during that time period is highly
specific, strong and persuasive. Otherwise, the prohibition would be unduly
undermined." Although the Commerce Committee Report does not state how
future adverse impacts are to be evaluated (apart from a single reference stating
that in categories where adverse impacts have occurred or "are likely to occur,"
an exemption should be made), the Committee's discussion of "distinct,
verifiable and measurable impacts" suggests that it would require a similar
showing with respect to future adverse impact.
Id.(citations omitted).
122 Id.
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This distinction, noticeably absent from the statutory language of section 1201
and based on an inference drawn from a suspect source, is erroneous.' 23 Apart
from lacking a solid basis in legislative history, the distinction makes little sense
considering the prospective and adaptive nature of the rulemaking exemption and
the plausibility of providing measured evidence of future harm.
The rulemaking exemption was enacted as a triennially changing procedure
ostensibly to confront new and emerging technologies that, when combined with
section 1201, could affect the legal interests of the user.121 In our digital society,
it is possible for many forms of technology to come and go within a span of a few
years.
In many situations, by the time proponents of an exemption can compile
distinct, verifiable, and measurable evidence of a likelihood of harm, the
technology that caused the harm will be replaced by a newer, ostensibly more
effective technology. This creates a vicious cycle in which the time necessary for
a proponent to gather enough evidence to warrant an exemption causes that
exemption to become irrelevant. This is particularly true in light of the fact that
exemptions are not granted on the basis of use or user, but by the characteristics
of a particular technology which, in many situations, will be obsolete before any
applicable three-year exemption expires.
It is also worthwhile to consider the logic of mandating a showing of distinct,
verifiable, and measurable proof of harm that has yet to occur. The Copyright
Office has not specified the degree of complexity or specificity with which such
proof should conform. In addition, the Assistant Secretary for Communications
and Information of the Department of Commerce-the Librarian's co-counselor
in this procedure-has counseled against the requirement, stating that it "cannot
logically be applied prospectively and.., therefore this 'refinement' should be
abandoned 'and a standard more consistent with the statutory language should be
adopted.' ),125

123 In response to charges that the House Manager's Report was a weak source of legislative
authority, the Librarian of Congress stated that:
Some commenters [sic] have suggested that the House Manager's Report is
entitled to little deference as legislative history. However, because that report is
consistent with the Commerce Committee Report, there is no need in this
rulemaking to determine whether the Manager's Report is entitled to less weight
than the Commerce Committee Report.
Id. at 64,559, n.4 (citations omitted).
124 See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 693.
125 Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 15 (citing Letter from
Nancy Victory, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of
Commerce to Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights (Aug. 11, 2003)).
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With respect to the term "likely adverse impacts," the Assistant. Secretary
stated that "there is no basis for requiring a showing of 'extraordinary circumstances in which the evidence of likelihood is highly specific, strong and
persuasive,' and asserted that no requirements beyond 'likely adverse effects' are
warranted."' 26
The Register of Congress responded to these assertions, stating that "firsthand knowledge" of harm and "actual instances of verifiable problems existing
in the marketplace" with regard to evidence of existing adverse effects "did not
refer to the required showing with respect to 'likely adverse effects.' ,127 The
Register stated that actual knowledge of adverse effects could not be applied
128
prospectively.
The Register confirmed that "[w]hile speculation alone will not be
sufficient . . . proof of 'likely adverse effects' requires only a showing of
likelihood-i.e. more likely than not, the traditional preponderance of the
proof required by the Register is no more
evidence standard. The burden of
12 9
stringent than the statutory text.'
If the rulemaking exemption is truly going to serve as an effective countermeasure, the proponents of an exemption must be able to provide the appropriate
amount of evidence in support of the exemption without including such data as
numerical projections of loss, ratios, or other similar statistically verifiable
burdens. In practice, if the burden is that high, eventually the pool of people who
can realistically apply for an exemption with the hope of serious consideration will
be only those who can afford to commission the evidence gathering studies.
Although it is unclear how specific, substantial, and material the proof of
likelihood of harm must be, due to the clarification by the Register of Copyrights
in her letter to the Librarian of Congress, it appears that situations seeking to
fulfill the "likely adverse effects" language will face no more stringent a burden
than those seeking to fulfill the "actual adverse effects" language.' 30 However, a
proponent proffering likely adverse effects would probably be compelled to offer
distinct and measurable evidence of a likelihood of harm. This is the same
requirement for a showing of actual harm that is immensely more difficult to
demonstrate prospectively. Same vein, impune the "verifiable and direct" proof
of harm standard to proponents of exemption renewal proposals is questionable,

i26

Id.

127 Id. at
129
'29
130

18.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
See generall Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11.
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since it is unlikely that any actual evidence of harm caused by section 1201 will
occur because the exemption has been in place for the previous three years. 3'
2. Has the Copyright Office Raised the Amount ofHarm That Must Be Shown Beyond
the Language of the Statute? A great source of controversy has arisen regarding
whether it was appropriate for the Copyright Office to insert the term "substantial" into the "adversely affected" language which sets forth the burden required
to obtain an exemption, especially in light of the term's absence in the language
of section 1201.132 Potentially, and depending on the interpreter, the term
"substantial," if and when used "in relation to the quantum of evidence necessary
to prove that the prohibition on circumvention has had an adverse effect on
noninfringing uses of works by users of copyrighted works[,]" could increase the
burden required for an exemption inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption
33
provision.

Indeed, the Assistant Secretary also expressed concern that "since the word
'substantial' does not appear in the statutory text, this 'more stringent requirement

'31
Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,578; Comments of
the Library Associations, sapra note 102.
We know of no specific evidence suggesting that persons have or have not been
adversely affected by the section 1201 prohibition in their ability to make
noninfringing uses ofliterary works, including computer programs and databases,
which are protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access
because of malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness. Similarly, we know of no
specific evidence suggesting that persons have or have not been adversely
affected in their ability to make noninfringing uses of compilations consisting of
lists ofwebsites blocked by filtering software applications. However, it is unclear
how "instances of verifiable problems occurring or... in the marketplace" can
be demonstrated given that exemptions to permit circumvention with respect to
these two classes have been in force since the effective date of the 1201(a)
prohibition ....
[I]t seems reasonable to presume that the adverse affects which
were deemed likely to occur [in the previous exemption period] are no less likely
to occur during the [upcoming three year period.]
Id.
132The Association of American Universities stated that:
Section 12 01(a)(1) expressly states that the scope of this rulemaking is to
determine 'whether persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely
to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by the prohibition...
in their ability to make noninfringing uses. . . of a particular class of copyrighted
works.' Significantly absent from the statute is the phrase 'substantially adversely
affected,' yet that is the standard that the Copyright Office applied and the
Librarian adopted in the 2000 Final Rule.
Comments of the Association of American Universities, supra note 102, at 6.
133Letter from Nancy Victory to Marybeth Peters, supra note 125.
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thus appears to add a significant new term to the express language of the
statute.' ,,134
The Assistant Secretary vocalized her concern in a letter which stated that the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NITA) was
"concerned that the standard [created by the Copyright Office's "substantially
adversely affected" language] imposes a significantly heightened burden on
proponents of an exemption, and is therefore inconsistent with the opportunity
that Congress intended to afford the user community."' 135 She further added that
"no basis exists to justify insertion of a material modifier into the text of section
1201 ..136
The Register defends against this accusation, stating that the Assistant
Secretary and the Register "actually appear to view the legal criteria governing this
rulemaking in much the same way."' 37 The Register asserted that the addition of
the word "substantial" was not meant to require a higher standard of proof, but
rather was used as "a shorthand phrase to supplement and clarify what both the
House Manager's Report and the House Commerce Committee Report stated,"
and that the "substantial adverse impact" simply means the opposite of
insubstantial, or de minimis adverse impact.13 The Register proffered that after
reading the legislative history, the addition of "substantial" does not make the
burden of proof more stringent than the statutory text, "but rather is a clarification that any showing must be based on real, verifiable, and reasonable
evidence.' 39
Due to the Register's clarification with regards to the insertion of the word
"substantial," it is unlikely that the Register has significantly increased the
quantitative burden of proof with respect to a showing of substantial adverse
effects resulting from to section 1201. However, this conclusion is difficult to
validate or invalidate since there have been no substantial legal challenges to the
Register's determination as to whether a proposal has met its burden.
3. Refusing to Acknowledge the Difference Between Digitaland Non-digitalFormats
Stifles the Effectiveness of the Rulemaking Provision. The Register of Copyrights has
repeatedly asserted that existing case law makes clear there is "no authority for the
proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much less the
Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical

" Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 14 (citing Letter from
Nancy Victory to Marybeth Peters, spra note 125).
135Id.
136 Id.

15.
id
.
Id at 17.

13' Id.at
138
139
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format of the originaL' ' 40 The Register uses this as rationale to minimize the
difference between digital and non-digital mediums in gauging the availability of
copyrighted works without DRM systems, a factor that is considered in
determining the existence of adverse effects resulting from section 1201. For
example, in rejecting a proposal for an exemption for public domain works, the
Register reasoned that:
[a]lthough the 'digital' version of a work may prevent certain
noninfringing uses of that particular copy, that fact alone does not
justify an exemption if other versions are unrestricted. Unless one
can show that a particular noninfringing use can only be accomplished by using the digital version, the existence of a public domain
or other work in alternative, unprotected formats provides a safety
valve for noninfringing uses. Users should recognize that works in
digital formats may be protected by the copyright owner differently
than hard copy or analog versions of the same works and should
consider this in making their purchasing decisions."'
Later in this discussion of rejected proposals for exemptions, the Register states
that "since books are available in many alternative formats, some of which are
that traditional
completely devoid of any technological protection, it would appear
42
noninfringing uses are unaffected in some of these formats."'
The Library Associations' comments assert that "the fact that a digital work
has a non-digital parallel (in print or VHS format), does not mean that the print
143
or VHS user is not adversely affected by lack of access to the digital format."'
The comments point to the fact that "DVD's are often packaged with additional
and
content to justify a new sale, and digital works can be extracted, manipulated
4
reconstituted in a manner quite different from print versions."' 4
The Library Associations state that "the substance and quality of noninfringing
use that may be made by print and VHS users can be dramatically inferior to the
digital user's experience. Yet, for purposes of this 1201 Rulemaking, such
differences are deemed immaterial by the Register."'4 This view is supported by
various other proposals for exemptions that were submitted to the Register.' 6

140
141
142
'4

See id. at 117 (citing Corky, 273 F.3d at 458).
Id. at 101.
Id. at 132.
Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 131, at 4.

141

Id.
Id. at 4-5.

146

Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection

144

Systems for Access Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,578 (Reply Comment of Matthew
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Furthermore, the Copyright Office has interpreted the term "availability" of
other works in such a draconian way as to essentially claim that a work is available
in analog form regardless of how difficult it is to obtain, so long as the analog
works are not completely obsolete.'47 The Copyright Office adopts the same
definition for the term "obsolete" as that in section 108(c) of the Copyright Act,
or is no
which states that a work is obsolete if it "is no longer manufactured
4
longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace."' 8
Although this definition includes a reasonableness factor, it is possible that a
work could be available from an obscure vendor that would make obtaining the
work very difficult, but still available for the purposes of exemption consideration.
This issue will become much more relevant as movies cease to be offered in VHS
format due to the shift in popularity to DVD's, but will still be available, at least
in theory, from such second hand vendors such as Ebay or used music and video
stores.
Until the definition of the term "obsolete" is given further clarification for the
purposes of these proceedings, it is possible that all works that have even been
issued in VHS format will be considered available far into the foreseeable future.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Register, in order to fully effectuate the
exemption provision, should also decide whether the media player itself has
become obsolete.
D. THE PRAGMATIC DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SUBMITING A SUCCESSFUL
PROPOSAL FOR AN EXEMPTION ARE SO BURDENSOME THAT THEY SERVE TO
FRUSTRATE THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE AND CHILL THE SCOPE OF POTENTIAL SUBMISSIONS

The burdens that a proposal for an exemption must meet are so great that the
proponent or submitter of the exemption, presumably those harmed by section
1201, are compelled to submit only very limited, and largely de minimis,
exemption proposals simply because past treatment of proposals show that if they

Perkins), availabk athttp://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/014.pdf. In his reply comment,
Mr. Perkins states that full-screen VHS cannot substitute for Widescreen DVD:
This is not merely a personal preference. It is a distinct, verifiable restriction on
what audiovisual material is available for noncommercial duplicative and
transformative uses. In failing to account for widescreen DVDs which lack a
widescreen analog alternative, the Office extracts the "cropped" information
from the sphere of public comment. Such a failure is harmful.
Id at 4.
1'7 Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011.
148 Id.
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ask for too much, their proposal will be wholly rejected. However, due to the
difficulty of the exemption proposal procedure, it is likely that most users
adversely affected by section 1201 will simply not submit a proposal at all and will
acquiesce to the compelled choice of payment or an absolute bar on access.
For example, the Library Associations, in the comments they submitted, offer
very limited and modest proposals, because "more appropriately ambitious
exemptions designed to address the growing imbalance between copyright holders
and the public with respect to access to copyrighted works were rejected by the
Register of Copyrights in the first rulemaking. The Copyright Office has made
clear that those proposed exemptions will not be reconsidered" within the
structure of exemptions for section 1201.149 The comments go on to say that
"[i]n our frank assessment, the section 1201 regulatory scheme, as implemented
by the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress, offers little promise
of meaningful relief from the genuinely adverse effects of the statutory prohibition on circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access
50
to copyrighted works."'
Similarly, the comments of the Association of American Universities state that:
[B]uilding the kind of evidentiary record apparently contemplated
by the Copyright Office simply is not practical for most institutions.... If access to allow fair use of a copyrighted work is
prevented by an access control technology and the use of that
technology truly is causing or threatening to cause significant harm
to an institution, the institution will, as a practical matter, agree to
the conditions imposed for such access (which usually means paying
increased royalties or license fees) rather than suffer the 'substantial
adverse effects' of foregoing such access. This is precisely the
scenario that Congress intended the triennial rulemaking to
prevent.5s
This scenario is worsened by the fact that the Copyright Office refuses to make
any theoretical extensions with regard to the scope of an exemption, which
effectively requires that any exemption that is to be granted must be submitted in
a proposal.'52 The fact that exemptions are granted on the character of the work

149Comments of the Library Associations, supra note 131, at 2.
150 Id. at 1-2.
' Comments of the Association of American Universities, supra note 102, at 2.
152 See Letter from Marybeth Peters to James H. Billington, supra note 11, at 36-38, 61.

"In

principle, these considerations apply to a wide variety of works, but proponents of an exemption
have provided sufficient facts to justify only the narrower class recommended herein."

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2005

37

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 12:309

makes, submitting a proposal for every conceivable medium or work causing
adverse effects to a user a practical impossibility. Therefore, even in a best-case
scenario where many users are compelled to propose exemptions, it is likely that
there will be many works left unconsidered due to the logistical impracticality of
total coverage.
This negative effect is compounded by the fact that if assertions of harm are
not submitted via the notice and comment process, the Copyright Office assumes
that no harm has occurred. The Register stated in the rejection of a proposal that
it appears (from the absence.., of any assertions to the contrary)
that the speculative fear of harm that was the impetus for this
proposal three years ago has, in the ensuing period, failed to
materialize in the marketplace. Had the fears been justified, it is
brought to the Copyright
quite evident that such examples would have been
53
rulemaking.'
second
this
in
attention
Office's
This assumption is not sound, however, based upon the previous discussion
that pragmatic circumstances may be such that the real harm suffered by users
never finds its way to the Copyright Office. This logic should compel the
Copyright Office to consider theoretical extensions for the scope of exemptions
in applicable situations.
E. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Ultimately, this Article concludes that the exemption provision is largely
ineffective in protecting fair use. This problem could be remedied by correcting
the faults of the exemption provision: the refusal to consider the use of a work,
the scope of the provision, and the faulty burden of proof. Additionally,
alternative solutions could vindicate the interests of users of copyrighted works.
Although the relevant authorities have not adopted these theoretical solutions,
implementation of such solutions would serve as an effective countermeasure to
the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions.
1. Claiming Errorin Granting a Refusal to Grant an Exemption Could Serve as a
Defense to CopyrightInfringement. The wording of the statute makes it theoretically
possible for a defendant accused under section 1201(a) who failed to win an
exemption to claim, as a defense, that the Librarian of Congress erred by refusing
to grant an exemption covering the type of conduct that the defendant is accused
of committing.'54 The rationale for such a defense would be that the defendant's

Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
5 See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 698, n.129. More specifically:

'5
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conduct falls within the criteria set out in section 1201(a) (1) (B) which, notwithstanding the Librarian's failure to grant an exemption, should relieve the
defendant from liability under section 1201 (a) (1)(A).155
This proposal, if implemented, could potentially serve to remedy the harm
done by the Librarian's refusal to consider the use or user of a copyrighted work
in granting exemptions. Given a judge who realizes that the refusal to consider
the use or user of a work contravenes the purpose of the statute, such a defense
could effectuate the same kind of ad hoc and precedent-setting relief afforded
by a courts fair use determination.
However, the proposal fails to offset the damage done by the exclusion of the
antitrafficking sections within the scope of the exemption provisions. Even if
such a defense is recognized without the ability to rely on the assistance of those
qualified to disable technologically complicated DRM systems, such relief would
be available only to the select few with the appropriate ingenuity and technological
know-how.
2. Ani-Circumvention Misuse. Fair use could also be furthered through an
extension of the "misuse doctrine" found in patent and copyright law to the
anticircumvention provisions of section 1201.156 Traditionally, the misuse
doctrine served as a judicially created defense for alleged infringers that could
prove that the plaintiff had abused or exceeded the rights granted to her, and as

155

Id.

[T]he argument emerges from the language that Congress used: "Neither the
exception under subparagraph (B) from the applicability of the prohibition
contained in subparagraph (A), nor any determination made in a rulemaking
conducted under subparagraph (C), may be used as a defense in any action to
enforce any provision of this tide other than this paragraph." 17 U.S.C. S
1201(a)(1)(E). From that wording, even a defendant who has failed to win
publication under subparagraph (C), but who convinces a court that he qualifies
for the exception under subparagraph (B), is forbidden from urging that status
under any doctrine of U.S. copyright law "other than this paragraph." Id. The
negative pregnant arises that he is allowed to urge the defense under this
paragraph. That the paragraph in question contains the basic provision compels
the conclusion that a defendant may urge his qualification under subparagraph
(B), even absent publication under subparagraph (C), as a defense to a charge
that he engaged in a wrongful circumvention of a technological measure.
Militating against that construction, though, subparagraph (B) itself sets forth:
"as determined in subparagraph (C)." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B). A court
attempting to reconcile these various provisions could seize on that language to
reject the defendant's activist construction of the statute.

detailed discussion of the doctrine of misuse is beyond the scope of this Article. For more
information regarding the misuse doctrine generally, and more specifically anticircumvention misuse,
see Dan L. Burk, Aniircumvenion Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2003).
156A
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a result, it would be inequitable to enforce those rights against the defendant. 5 '
The misuse defense, similar to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, could be
raised by any defendant opposing the culpable plaintiff, not just the victims of the
misuse.
The extension of the misuse doctrine to claims under section 1201 rests on the
premise that the rights granted to a copyright owner under the anticircumvention
provisions can be abused in the same manner as the other rights granted under
the Copyright Act.' Indeed, the anticircumvention provisions appears to invite
abuse due to the great deal of power given to the copyright owners that can
improperly be used as leverage. Because the anticircumvention provisions exist
outside of the boundaries of traditional copyright, the doctrine would need to be
extended order to address the improprieties caused by section 1201.'
As an equitable doctrine, this theoretical extension could reach both the
antitrafficking and anticircumvention provisions of section 1201, and provide an
elasticity to conform and adapt to various situations. However, like in patent and
copyright law, the misuse doctrine is of limited effectiveness since the plaintiff is
free to assert her rights once the misuse has been purged. 6 °
3. Fair-UseConstitutionalMandate.Fair use, although a statutory right, has yet
to expressly rise to the level of a constitutional requirement.' 61 However, such a
promotion is not an absurd proposition. Indeed, the constitutional status of fair
use is currently uncertain. The Supreme Court has recently stated that "[f]rom the
infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts ....""'
It can be argued that "if right holders can effectively prevent access to an
information product through technological and contractual measures, the debate
about fair use becomes irrelevant unless fair use takes on the status of a
constitutionally protected right."' 6 3 If fair use is constitutionally protected, then

1s7Id at 1113-19.

1s8
Id at 1096-97. "Just as improper leveraging of patents and copyrights may properly be
curtailed by application of the misuse doctrine, so improper leveraging of paracopyright should
properly be curtailed by application of misuse."
159

Id.

Id.
"61See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 196364 (1994); Corky, 273 F.3d at 458; see also McJohn, supra note 25.
'62Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. The Second Circuit stated in Cory, "[Me note that the Supreme
Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required, although some isolated statements in
its opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement." Corly, 273 F.3d at 458 (citations
omitted).
163Jacqueline Lipton, Information Properly: Rghts and Reponsibiilies, 56 FLA. L. REv. 135, 158
160

(2004).
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courts would likely refuse to extend the DMCA to situations where it infringes on
a persons ability to exercise their fair use.'
Although this might be the most
extreme solution to the problem, it also is probably the most effective.
Until fair use is granted status as a constitutional right, "reliance on [the
defense] to achieve an appropriate balance of interests in information products
is futile." 6 ' As discussed earlier, "[w]here potential fair users cannot access an
information product, the legal protection of their right to use it is irrelevant" as
one cannot use a work to which one has no access.' 66
While such a status change for fair use would almost certainly compel
vindication of fair use by the courts-if not Congress-the reactionary impact of
such a decision should not be overlooked. Most notably, such a classification
could serve to undermine the purpose of section 1201 or force Congress to
amend the statute, leaving it largely ineffectual in an effort to fully comply with
fair use. However, this point is currently relevant, since the statute is at odds with
the statutory right of fair use in its current state.
Ultimately, until some solution is brought about to equalize fair use with the
rights of a copyright holder, the anticircumvention provisions of section 1201 will
continue to provide unbalanced power to copyright owners to the detriment of
those wishing to make fair use of copyrighted works.
V. CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the triennial rulemaking exemption provision for the
purpose of counterbalancing the harmful effects of section 1201 (a) (1)
(A) and the
preservation of fair use.' 67 In theory, a rulemaking procedure for the granting of
exemptions that can adapt to technological and societal variables would serve as
an adequate remedy to the injustice that could arise under the DMCA. Copyright
owners could protect their works from legitimate infringement and those denied
the ability to make fair use of these works could simply petition the Register of
Copyrights for an exemption from liability for their act of circumvention.
Unfortunately, the text and execution of the exemption provision are too
flawed to serve as a meaningful remedy to section 1201's effect on the ability to
make fair use of a work. Instead, the rulemaking procedure and resulting
exemptions are an excruciatingly limited and largely futile exercise that assists only
those with the rare need and advanced knowledge required to take advantage of
the proverbial get-out-of-jail-free (but only for three years) card.

164 Id.

165 Id. at 159.
166

167

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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The Register's refusal to consider use or user-based classes for exemptions is
wholly inconsistent with the principles of fair use, which is a technology-neutral
doctrine that is defined by the use or user of a copyrighted work. Instead of
protecting fair use, the exemptions serve as a remedy only in situations where a
particular technology imposes a more onerous burden on its users than the
appropriate authority is prepared to allow. Although this result is desirable over
no remedy at all, it does not effectively protect a person's ability to engage in fair
use of the copyrighted work.
Because the provision excludes any relief from liability of the antitrafficking
provisions, users who wish to circumvent access control measures within the
scope of an exemption are left to go it alone. This means that a user, without
technologically or systematically trafficked assistance must decode and crack
complex systems that often contain measures such as encrypted mathematical
algorithms to prevent circumvention. Moreover, even if the user is able to
circumvent these measures, she will be liable under section 1201 of the DMCA
if she uses her system or device on a class of works not covered by an exemption
or shares it through trafficking, regardless of whether the resulting use was fair.
In conclusion, perhaps the most effective way to illustrate the flawed nature
of exemption provisions is to describe not those who are unable to take
advantage of the exemptions, but one who is. For example, a visually impaired
computer user who has an advanced understanding of software circumvention
might be able to take advantage of the exemption granted to ebooks that have
disabled the read-aloud function or prevented enabling screen readers. However,
she must make certain that there are absolutely no existing editions of the ebook
that permit the read-aloud function or enable the screen reader. If she is capable
of complying with the limited exemption and circumventing the technologically
complicated access control measure, she should do so with haste-the guarantee
of relief from liability will expire in less than three years.
Until the execution or statutory language in the exemption provision is
changed it will be an impotent protection measure and almost all of the pleas for
users who request the right to make fair use of a work will fall upon deaf ears.
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